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A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral Character
Requirement for Bar Admission
Michael K. McChystal*
American jurisdictions universally require good moral character
for admission to the bar.' The good moral character requirement
has eluded useful definition and has been described as possessing
"shadowy rather than precise bounds."' 2 The United States Supreme
Court has held that the requirement is constitutionally permissible as
long as pre-admission conduct which is the basis for denying bar admission has a "rational connection with the applicant's fitness or ca'3
pacity to practice law."
Because the requirement of good moral character for bar admission is designed principally to protect the public from unethical lawyers, 4 the assertion of any such rational connection requires the belief
that an applicant's conduct during the bar admission process serves
as a useful predictor of how he will behave if admitted to practice
law. Thus, the prevailing view of bar admission authorities is that
past conduct predicts future conduct.5
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Member, Wisconsin

Board of Attorneys Professional Competence (the bar admission board in Wisconsin). The
author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Professor Charles D. Clausen and Mr.
Robert Koenig to the development of this article.
1 See general'y WEST PUBLISHING CO., RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN THE
UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES (1982); VII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIREcTORY
(1984). For example, SuP. CT. R. 5.1 provides in part: "It shall be requisite to the admission
to practice in this Court. . .that the applicant appears to the Court to be of good moral and
professional character."
2 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 249 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
3 Id. at 239.
4 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-2 (1982); see also Florida
Bd. of Bar Examiners re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978); In re Taylor, 647 P.2d 462,
467 (Or. 1982); Pushinsky v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 266 S.E.2d 444, 450 (W.
Va. 1980).
An additional rationale for the good moral character requirement is to protect the orderly administration of justice. Although this goal has more frequent relevance in lawyer
discipline cases, it is also mentioned as a concern in bar admission cases. E.g., Ex ParteWall,
107 U.S. 265, 274 (1883) (disbarment); Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d
447, 462, 421 P.2d 76, 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 239 (1966) (bar admission).
5 Although expressed in a dissenting opinion, the prevailing view is stated well in In re
Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 21, 55 S.E. 635, 642 (1906) (Brown, J., dissenting):
[I]f the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character, the
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Although this is a rational and attractive premise, it has not
been proven empirically in the context of bar admission. 6 Bar admission authorities are unlikely to employ, in the foreseeable future, any
psychometrically-sound device to assist in determining whether applicants satisfy the good moral character requirement. 7 In the abchances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace,
instead of an ornament, to his great calling, a curse, instead of a benefit, to his
community, a Quirk, a Gammon, or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith, or a
Ruffin.
It is interesting to compare the treatment of past conduct in bar admission cases with its
treatment under the rules ofevidence. Generally, evidence ofpast wrongs is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show the commission of subsequent acts. See FED.
R. EVID. 404(b); cf. FED. R. EvID. 405(a). While evidence tending to prove an actor's propensity to commit acts of a given sort generally may be excluded in other settings, proof of such
propensities is at the heart of moral character assessments in bar admission cases. See also
Mendez, California'sNew Law on CharacterEvidence.- Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of
Recent PsychologicalStudies, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1003 (1984).
6 In the early 1970's, an American Bar Association committee proposed research studies
to identify character traits which, when present in a lawyer, make it highly likely that the
lawyer would engage in unethical conduct. The goal was to test whether bar admission applicants possessed the offending traits and to deny admission to those who did. See Jaworski,
President'sPage, 58 A.B.A. J. 667 (1972); Information Report of the Section of Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar, 97 REPORTS OF A.B.A. 984 (1972).
An excerpt from the committee report appears in Dershowitz, Preventive Disbarment." The
Numbers Are Against It, 58 A.B.A. J. 815 (1972). The report proposed:
A. An interdisciplinary inquiry into what is now being done or projected in
other professions or businesses:
(1) To identify those significant elements of character that may predictably
give rise to misconduct in violation of professional responsibilities.
(2) To estimate the capacity of those inimical elements to persist despite the
maturing process of the individual and the impact of the stabilizing influence of
legal education.
B. A "hindsight" study of selected cases of proved dereliction of lawyers to
ascertain whether any discoverable predictive information could have been obtained at the law student level by feasible questionnaires or investigations; and if so,
what type of inquiry would have been fruitful.
Id
Alan Dershowitz argued convincingly against the empirical feasibility of using such
methods to screen out future violators of professional standards. See generaly Dershowitz,
supra. Dershowitz contended that any such screening device would likely ensnare more persons who would establish clean records as lawyers than future violators. Id.
7 But cf. L. KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES
AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 409-12 (1981). Kohlberg identified various stages of moral development and devised operational measures for assessing an individual's moral development.
Kohlberg's stages relate principally to the relative sophistication of a person's moral reasoning.
Sophisticated moral reasoning, however, does not ensure moral conduct. Moral conduct
requires the identification of the moral problem at issue so that moral reasoning may be
invoked to resolve the problem. In addition, moral conduct requires action in accord with the
results of the moral reasoning: an actor may morally reason on a sophisticated level and then
act contrary to the conclusions he reaches. Moreover, even if a person identifies the moral
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sence of any effective testing device, an applicant's moral character is
ordinarily assessed through information gathered from applications
and questionnaires, letters of recommendation, follow-up investigations, interviews, and hearings. 8 Bar admission authorities decide
whether an applicant meets the good moral character requirement
by assessing all of the relevant facts before them. Justice Frankfurter
described this decision-making process:
No doubt satisfaction of the requirement of moral character involves an exercise of delicate judgment on the part of those who
reach a conclusion, having heard and seen the applicant for admission, a judgment. . . that. . . expresses "an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed
and tangled impressions; impressions which may lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth." 9
Decisions which rely on "unnamed and tangled impressions...
which may lie beneath consciousness" run serious risks, especially
when they may be devastating to a bar admission applicant's future
livelihood and reputation. Bar admission decisions will be more consistent, rational, and just if the reasons supporting them are consciously recognized, clearly stated, and explicitly related to the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Visceral reactions are
an inadequate basis for denying an applicant a license to practice
law. Bar admission authorities should be expected to articulate the
rational connection between the grounds for their moral character
objections to an applicant's admission and the applicant's fitness or
capacity to practice law.
This article is an effort to raise consciousness, principally by
identifying significant threads that make up the fabric of the good
moral character requirement. 10 This purpose is moderately frustrated by two dynamics. First, unless bar admission authorities seek
to block an applicant's admission on moral character grounds, the
problem, analyzes the problem in a sophisticated way, and acts in accord with his analysis,
the act may be antithetical to professional standards if the actor possesses values different
than those of the profession. Therefore, the work of Kohlberg and his colleagues does not
necessarily hold the key to improving moral character assessments in the bar admission process, though the work holds special interest for those engaged in making such assessments.
8 For an expanded discussion, see BAR EXAMINER'S HANDBOOK 137-87 (S. Duhl ed.

1980).
9 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907)).
10 Although relevant to the good moral character requirement for bar admission, this
article does not address good moral character standards in other professions or in immigration
and naturalization cases, nor does it assess due process considerations in applying the standard in bar admission cases.
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result of the moral character assessment is generally not reported.
Thus, a host of cases in which bar admission was granted notwithstanding blemishes relating to moral character evade evaluation.
This may conceal some of the greatest inconsistencies among bar admission cases. Second, courts are often cursory in describing the underlying facts and in offering the rationales for their decisions in
moral character cases.1"
In most states, the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility constitute the ethical duties imposed upon lawyers
12
and form the only bases for a finding of unfitness to practice law.
Not all violations of the disciplinary rules prove unfitness to practice.
Certainly, violations of disciplinary rules which do not result in the
offending lawyer losing his license for any period of time cannot support a finding of unfitness to practice, since a lawyer could not be
permitted to retain his licensure without interruption if he were
deemed unfit to practice.13 Conversely, the imposition of the severe
sanctions of long-term suspension from practice or disbarment must
surely reflect a determination that the offending lawyer is unfit to
practice law.
The fact that the disciplinary rules embody the full statement of
bases for determining that a lawyer is unfit to practice for reasons of
misconduct' 4 has significant implications in assessing the appropriate
11 Extremely vague denials of admission to the bar may violate due process requirements.
See In Re Berkan, 648 F.2d 1386, 1388 (1st Cir. 1981) (applicant was informed of her denial in
a one-sentence letter providing no reasons).
12 Conduct not proscribed in a specific disciplinary rule may be grounds for disbarment,
but only if it is "conduct which all responsible lawyers would recognize as improper for a
member of the profession." In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 555 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
This exception becomes superfluous under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
which contains a catch-all rule prohibiting "any other conduct that adversely reflects on [the
lawyer's] fitness to practice law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1102(A) (6) (1982). This provision also makes clear the Code's position that all lawyer misconduct under the Code adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. See also id.
Canon 1 n.14.
13 A determination of unfitness to practice logically accompanies the sanctions of suspension (for more than a nominal duration) and disbarment in the same jurisdiction in which the
determination is made. The situation differs when the issue concerns the effect of disciplinary
action taken by one jurisdiction on licensure in another jurisdiction. Generally, one jurisdiction is not bound by disciplinary action in another jurisdiction, even though bar admission in
that jurisdiction is derived from admission in the other jurisdiction. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S.
544, 547 (1968) (effects of a state's disciplinary action on lawyer's admission to practice in
federal court). See generaly Annot., 173 A.L.R. 298 (1948) (effect of one state's disciplinary
action on lawyer's admission to practice in another state).
14 Even the catch-all provision of DR 1-102(A)(6) rarely supplies a sole basis for disciplinary action. A LEXIS search for attorney discipline cases in which DR 1-102(A)(6) is cited
disclosed 676 cases in state courts, only two of which did not also invoke some other discipli-
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scope of the good moral character requirement. Bar admission can
be denied on moral character grounds only upon a finding of unfitness to practice law,' 5 which is defined by the ethical duties imposed
upon lawyers, usually under some variant of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. It follows, then, that only that pre-admission conduct which indicates that the applicant would violate
disciplinary rules if admitted to practice may justify a finding of lack
of good moral character.
Notwithstanding the logic of this approach, some jurisdictions
distinguish between moral character standards for applicants to the
bar and for admitted lawyers. These jurisdictions usually hold that
the standards of behavior for bar admission applicants are less defined and more expansive than the ethical duties to which lawyers
are bound.' 6 This produces the anomalous result that persons must
demonstrate a better moral character to be granted a license to practice law than to keep it.
Reported decisions involving questions of good moral character
offer no compelling justification for this unequal treatment.' 7 The
usual justification is evidentiary in nature: bar admission applicants
generally have the burden of establishing good moral character, 18
nary rule as a basis for a judicially imposed sanction. One of these cases involved an attorney's unauthorized disbursement of funds held in escrow to his client. In re Power, 91 NJ.
408, 451 A.2d 666 (1982). The other case involved a lawyer's failure to file a client's tax
return with the court in connection with the client's petition for a reduction in alimony payments. In response to the attorney's claim that no disciplinary rule encompasses mere negligence, the court invoked DR 1-102(A)(6). In re Logan, 71 N.J. 583, 367 A.2d 419 (1976),
modj5'ing 70 NJ. 222, 358 A.2d 787 (1976).
15 Although bar admission may be denied on moral character grounds whenever the
applicant's conduct adversely reflects on his or her fitness or capacityto practice law, the word
"capacity" adds little in such cases. It is difficult to conceive of a moral character case in
which the applicant is adjudged fit for law practice and otherwise qualified for admission, yet
is determined to lack capacity for law practice. While it is possible to ascribe a narrow meaning to "fitness" so that "capacity" becomes an important consideration, courts do not appear
to have done so. No cases have been discovered where the court, in the context of a moral
character assessment, focuses primarily on an applicant's "capacity" to practice law.
16 See In re Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 474-75, 163 P. 657, 660 (1917); In re Florida Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 373 So. 2d 890, 891 (Fla. 1979); see also In re Stepsay, 15 Cal. 2d 71, 75, 98 P.2d
489,491 (1940) ("[T]he court may properly refuse to admit an applicant to practice law upon
proof which would not justify an order of disbarment.").
17 Early cases sometimes distinguished an admitted lawyer's property right in continued
licensure from an applicant's mere expectancy of licensure. See In re O'Brien, 79 Conn. 46, 55,
63 A. 777, 780 (1906), overruledon due process grounds, In re Dinan, 157 Conn. 67, 72, 244 A.2d
608, 610 (1968). This distinction is rarely made in modern cases. See Reese v. Board of
Comm'rs, 379 So. 2d 564, 569 (Ala. 1980).
18 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 41 (1961); In re Ascher, 81 Ill. 2d
485, 411 N.E.2d 1 (1980); In re Moore, 301 N.C. 634, 272 S.E.2d 826 (1981).
Generally, the applicant has the burden of establishing a prima facie showing of good
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while the burden of proving a lawyer's unethical conduct generally
falls on the discipline board. 19 Courts have used these differing burdens of proof to justify a more expansive scope of relevancy in bar
admission cases. Some courts avoid the evidentiary clutter resulting
from an expansive scope of relevancy by summarily holding that the
applicant has failed to meet his burden of proving good moral character, without clearly specifying the weight given to negative evidence or identifying the connection between the negative evidence
and fitness to practice law.
Some jurisdictions may apply a more stringent standard to bar
applicants than to admitted lawyers on the theory that lawyers are
subject to greater temptations to engage in misconduct. Succumbing
to lesser temptations is, arguably, more telling morally than succumbing to greater temptations. Moreover, one who succumbs to
lesser temptations prior to bar admission may be especially likely to
misbehave when confronted by the greater temptations present in
law practice. While this reasoning is appealing at first blush, it is a
highly speculative basis for depriving an otherwise-qualified individual of the opportunity to practice his chosen profession. In particular, it ignores the serious temptations to which bar applicants are
often subject by virtue of their social and economic circumstances.
In some respects, the social and economic circumstances in which
lawyers live and work may be less conducive to serious temptation
20
than applicants' pre-admission circumstances.
It is a premise of this article that bar applicants and admitted
lawyers should be treated similarly; thus, bar admission authorities
should deny admission only if past misconduct portends that the applicant, if admitted, would engage in conduct unacceptable for a licensed lawyer. Unacceptable conduct for a licensed lawyer is
conduct prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility, or
whatever ethical standards the jurisdiction imposes upon its licensed
lawyers. This requirement serves the important goal of protecting
moral character, which the bar admission authority may introduce evidence to rebut. See In
re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 57, 253 S.E.2d 912, 918 (1979).
19 See, e.g., Dodd v. Board of Comm'rs, 365 So. 2d 975, 977 (Ala. 1979); State ex rel.
Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Erickson, 204 Neb. 692, 700, 285 N.W.2d 105, 109 (1979); see also
In re Burrows, 291 Or. 135, 629 P.2d 820 (1981).
20 Several forces work in combination to lessen the temptation to which lawyers are subject. Lawyers typically enjoy greater financial security than the public at large. Peer pressure
within the profession discourages misconduct, and lawyers often work in groups in which
supervision by peers increases the likelihood that wrongful conduct will be detected. The
adversary process itself may discourage lawyer misconduct, and the threat of disbarment provides an additional deterrent.
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the public equally from new unfit lawyers and from experienced unfit lawyers. When addressing the question of whether to admit an
applicant who has engaged in misconduct, bar admission authorities
and courts should be substantially guided by the treatment afforded
admitted lawyers who engage in similar misconduct. In all events,
bar admission authorities and courts should look to an applicant's
more recent conduct to determine whether rehabilitation has cor2
rected a past unfitness. 1
With few exceptions, 22 bar admission cases involving the good
moral character requirement fall within the following categories:
political belief and conduct; misconduct in the bar admission process;
past illegal conduct; financial malfeasance; and emotional or mental
instability. Each of these categories of misconduct will be discussed
in turn, with a focus upon the nature of the conduct and its relation
to ethical standards imposed upon lawyers.
I.

Political Belief and Conduct

Bar admission cases in which the applicant's moral character is
at issue because of the applicant's political belief or conduct fall
within three general categories: cases in which the applicant's political beliefs and actions have been disclosed and the bar admission
authority must decide whether to deny admission based on the applicant's politics per se; cases in which the applicant has engaged in
politically-motivated illegal conduct; 23 and cases in which the applicant declines to answer questions of a political nature in the bar admission process, thereby giving rise to charges of misconduct in that
24
process.
Thought, speech, association, and conduct in the bar admission
process enjoy constitutional protection. In Schware v. Boardof Bar Examiners,25 the California court prohibited an applicant to the bar
from taking the bar examination because he had not shown good
21

In order to satisfy the requirement, the applicant must be of good moral character at

the time of admission. See In re Estes, 580 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1978); In re Taylor, 293 Or. 285, 647
P.2d 462 (1982). See general.y Annot. 88 A.L.R.3d 192 (1978).
22 See, e.g., In re Application for Admission to the Bar, 378 Mass. 795, 392 N.E.2d 533
(1979) (applicant used judicial processes in a way inconsistent with standards expected of
lawyers), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); In re Bowers, 138 Tenn. 662, 200 S.W. 821 (1918)
(applicant solicited business for a lawyer and drafted contingent-fee agreements for 50% fee).
23 See generally text accompanying notes 84-113 infla.
24 See text accompanying notes 50-66 inj/a.
25 353 U.S. 232 (1957). The Supreme Court held that previous membership in the Communist party, use of aliases, and arrests without formal charges, did not under the circumstances establish grounds for refusal of admission to the bar.
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moral character. Schware had been a member of the Communist
Party for eight years, but had not been a member for the thirteen
years before he applied to take the examination. In reversing, the
Supreme Court held that in order for political expression to form the
basis for denial of admission to the bar on moral character grounds,
the expression must bear some "rational connection with the appli'26
cant's fitness or capacity to practice law."
The law clearly answers the question of when bar admission
may be denied on the basis of an applicant's politics per se.
"[K]nowing membership in an organization advocating the overthrow of the Government by force or violence, on the part of one
sharing the specific intent to further the organization's illegal goals,
may be made criminally punishable" 27 and presumably may be the
basis for denial of admission to the bar on moral character grounds.
The rule has been clearly formulated, although not easily applied. In
any event, few courts have denied admission explicitly on such
grounds.

28

Politically-motivated criminal activity has generated an interesting line of moral character cases. Disciplinary rules prohibit a lawyer
from knowingly counseling or assisting a client in engaging in illegal
conduct 29 and, from engaging in illegal conduct in the lawyer's own
right in the course of representing a client. 30 In addition, the disciplinary rules prohibit a lawyer from engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and from engaging in acts which are prejudicial
to the administration ofjustice. 3 1 These standards, which help define
fitness to practice law, may be rationally connected to an applicant's
26 Id. at 239; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 44-46 (1961).
27 Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 165
(1971); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding the constitutionality
of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982), which makes it a crime, under some circumstances,
to advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence).
28 See, e.g., Siegel v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 10 Cal. 3d 156, 514 P.2d 967, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 15 (1973), in which the bar admissions committee refused to certify the applicant's good
moral character because he had falsely testified before the committee in saying he had not
advocated violent political action, rather than because he had publicly advocated violent
political action. But see In re Cassidy, 268 A.D. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944), afd on rehearing,
270 A.D. 1046, 63 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1946), afdper curiam, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947).
29 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1982); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (as adopted by the House of Delegates of the

American Bar Association on August 2, 1983), reprintedin 69 A.B.A. J. 1671 (1983).
30 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(8) (1982); cf.MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983).
31 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3),(5) (1982); cf.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b),(d) (1983). See genera,4'y text accompanying notes 84-102 infia.
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politically-inspired illegal conduct or advocacy of violent overthrow
of the government. If they are, then the applicant may properly be
denied admission to the bar.
On the other hand, it is wise to consider the effect of a wholesale
exclusion of applicants whose political beliefs and action are of this
nature. In his stirring dissent in In re Anastaplo,32 Justice Black extolled the heroic courage of lawyers who "dared to speak in defense
of causes and clients without regard to personal danger to themselves." '33 Regarding the need for these dissident voices in the bar,
Justice Black wrote:
The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if
it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force
the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving,
government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.
• . . [T]he Government is being permitted to strike out at
those who are fearless
enough to think as they please and say
34
what they think.
The Supreme Court of Washington ignored these considerations
in In re Brooks,35 in which the court denied permission to take the bar
examination to a conscientious objector who had, more than a decade before, violated criminal law by refusing to report to a civilian
labor camp. The divided court denied Brooks' application because
he had defied the law by refusing to honor his duty to his country
' 36
and its "great heritage of liberty.
The duty to obey the law (the corollary of impermissible defiance of law) is generally not applied with strict exactitude in bar
32 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
33 Id. at 115 (Black, J., dissenting). On a list of lawyers possessing "the uncommon virtue
of courage to stand by [their] principles at any cost," Justice Black included Malsherbes, who
defended Louis XVI against the revolutionary government of France at the cost of his life;
Chief Justice Hughes, who as a lawyer defended socialist members of the New York legislature who were suspended from that body because of their political views; Clarence Darrow;
and others. Id. at 114-15.
34 Id. at 115-16.
35 57 Wash. 2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813 (1961).
36 Id. at 69, 355 P.2d at 842; see also In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), in which the
Court affirmed the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court denying the petitioner's application
for admission to the Illinois bar. The petitioner's religious beliefs made him a conscientious
objector to military service, who eschewed the use of force regardless of circumstances. Although the petitioner had not violated any law, the justices of the Supreme Court of Illinois
denied the petitioner's application because they determined that he could not swear, in good
conscience, to uphold the Illinois constitution, which contained a provision requiring men in
petitioner's age group to serve in the state militia in time of war. The Supreme Court held
that the denial did not violate the first amendment as applied to the states by the fourteenth
amendment.
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admission cases. Cases abound in which applicants were admitted to
the bar notwithstanding prior criminal convictions, 3 7 even recent
ones. 38 The disciplinary rules do not suggest that lawyers be disciplined for all forms of criminal conduct.3

9

Rather, when lawyers en-

gage in criminal conduct, courts consider the nature of the conduct
and the circumstances surrounding it. These considerations are especially relevant where the applicant's criminal conduct involves political expression.
With these considerations in mind, the Supreme Court of California, in Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners,40 admitted an applicant to the bar notwithstanding his convictions for unlawful
assembly, remaining present at a place of unlawful assembly, disturbing the peace, and trespass upon land for the purpose of obstructing lawful business, all in connection with a civil rights sit-in.
The court emphasized the non-violent nature of these acts and the
widespread view that non-violent civil disobedience can be a morally-legitimate form of political expression. The court cited the
works of several legal scholars on the legitimacy of civil disobedience,
41
as well as works by Thoreau, Laski, Gandhi, Plato and Aristotle.
Brooks and Hallinanare inconsistent, at least in their treatment of
non-violent civil disobedience, since the Brooks court ignored the applicant's motivation in refusing to report for alternative service. The
opinion identified no rational connection between the applicant's
dated illegal conduct and his present fitness to practice law, except to
say:
We are not inclined to adopt a transitory theory as to the
applicant's character. Age alone has not reduced his potential
for war resistance to zero. .

.

. An old lawyer can impede his

country's war effort in many ways as well as a young one. 42

This, of course, avoids the crucial issue, which is the relationship
of draft resistance to fitness to practice law, or, more specifically,
whether a former draft resistor is likely to breach ethical duties. The
37 See Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 192 (1978).
38 See, e.g., In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 183 So. 2d 688, 690 (Fla. 1966) ("[A]
conviction of petty larceny would not deprive an individual of his or her right to be admitted
to The Florida Bar if otherwise qualified.").
39 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3) (1982); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983). See generally text accompanying
notes 84-113 infra.
40 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
41 Id. at 461, 421 P.2d at 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
42 In re Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d at 68, 355 P.2d at 841.
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court denied admission on moral character grounds without identifying the rational connection required by Schware.
The commission of minor crimes in the furtherance of morallylegitimate political objectives can be of substantial service to society.
This is a nation which once permitted slavery, denied women the
right to vote, reneged on treaties with Indian nations, and interned
life-long citizens solely because of their Japanese ancestry. Who
knows which of our current national policies and laws will be rejected as morally repugnant in future years? Moral leaders who call
attention to an immoral status quo may be required to engage in
minor acts of civil disobedience to do so.
Political advocacy which is criminal per se poses unique
43
problems in the context of the good moral character requirement.
Where an applicant has committed a non-political crime motivated
by political belief, it is unlikely that his licensure as a lawyer poses
risks any greater than those ordinarily associated with the admission
of a person who has committed that crime. Therefore, criminal conduct motivated by political belief should certainly carry no greater
weight in the bar admission process than criminal conduct not so
motivated. In fact, the political motivation may be an ameliorating
factor because of the moral legitimacy of some forms of civil disobedience. In no event should the political motivation be seen as an
aggravating factor.44
Consistent with the disciplinary rules, political belief and conduct ought to be invoked to deny bar admission only when a political
crime has been committed. 45 This does not require that the applicant have been convicted of a political crime; the "conviction" may
43 A state may deny admission to the bar on moral character grounds if the applicant
cannot, in good conscience, swear to the attorney's oath required in most jurisdictions. In re
Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945). Attorney's oaths typically require an attorney to swear to
support the constitutions of the United States and the state where the attorney seeks admission to the bar. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-60-4 (West 1983). The illegal advocacy of
overthrow of the government by force or violence poses moral character difficulties for this
and other reasons.
44 Consider three hypothetical cases in which an applicant has been convicted of malicious destruction of government property: (1) the act has no political overtones and is committed only for the "thrill" of it; (2) the act is done to protest the war in Vietnam; and (3) the
act is done to show opposition to court-ordered busing to cure past illegal school segregation.
Assuming that questions of rehabilitation are not at issue, neither the second nor third case
should be treated more harshly in the bar admission process than the first case. An argument
could be made for treating the second case less harshly than the other cases.
45 Although it is not easy to define "political" crimes, certain crimes seem to qualify,
including treason, sabotage, sedition, and flag desecration. Ste, e.g., WIs. STAT. §§ 946.01-.06
(1982). Even absent rehabilitation, it is not clear that all such criminal acts should be an
impediment to bar admission on moral character grounds. The test remains whether the act
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be reached in the bar admission process itself.46 Convictions for some
political crimes may adversely reflect on the applicant's fitness to
practice law, particularly where the criminal conduct reflects such
distrust of the legal process that the applicant, absent a change of
47
heart, would likely violate ethical duties imposed upon lawyers.
The rational connection required by Schware might be present in
those cases.
II.

Misconduct in the Bar Admission Process

If the good moral character requirement is to be effective, an
applicant's failure to truthfully disclose material information solicited by bar admission authorities must be an impediment to admission. Misconduct in the bar admission process is one of the most
frequently cited bases for denial of admission on moral character
grounds.
Applicants are expected to answer all questions truthfully and
completely. 4 8 Failure to disclose material, solicited information
adversely reflects on the applicant's fitness to practice law. See text accompanying notes 14-23
,p'ra.
46 Bar admission authorities may independently assess evidence of prior misconduct
notwithstanding an acquittal or dismissal of criminal charges relating to that misconduct. See
In re Leff, 127 Ariz. 62, 618 P.2d 232 (1980) (no criminal charges filed for impeding an IRS
undercover investigation); Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re L.K.D., 397 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1981)
(acquittal of shoplifting charge); Nall v. Board of Bar Examiners, 98 N.M. 172, 646 P.2d 1236
(1982) (charges of conspiracy to sell heroin dropped).
But see Martin B. v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 33 Cal. 3d 717, 661 P.2d 160, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 610 (1983), where the court reiterated the general principle that bar admission authorities may assess evidence of misconduct even if criminal charges based on the misconduct were
terminated in favor of an applicant. However, the court held that the committee erred in
conducting a "retrial" of ten-year-old rape charges, where original transcripts and some key
witnesses were unavailable and the presiding judge at the criminal trial was deceased.
See also In re Cassidy, 268 A.D. 282, 51 N.Y.S. 202 (1944), afdon rehearing,270 A.D. 1046,
63 N.Y.S. 840 (1946), afdpercuriam, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947), where evidence of the
applicant's advocacy of unlawfully forming armed units for use against what he considered to
be subversive elements was the basis for denial of admission, notwithstanding the applicant's
acquittal of a criminal conspiracy charge based on the same conduct.
47 See note 46 supra. Whether a given political crime adversely reflects on the applicant's
fitness to practice law would depend at least on the gravity of the crime and the motivation of
the applicant in committing the crime. For example, publicly desecrating a flag may be
motivated by opposition to a single government policy, such as the war in Vietnam, and
might not be treated as adversely reflecting on the perpetrator's fitness to practice law.
48 Cf MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101(A) (1982); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (1983). Because good moral character is an
unpredictable standard, the applicant who has engaged in (or been accused of engaging in)
conduct which may raise questions of moral character has a serious tactical problem in deciding how to disclose that information. Bare disclosure without comment may provoke charges
of lack of candor, while disclosure with explanation or defense may also provoke charges of
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surely raises questions about the applicant's fitness for law practice
and may be the basis for denial of admission to the bar.49 Fraud on
courts and tribunals is an extremely grave offense under the disciplinary rules,50 and the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
prohibits lawyers from making materially false statements or failing
to disclose material, solicited facts in the bar admission process. 51 No
aspect of the good moral character requirement more directly implicates ethical standards imposed upon lawyers than the prohibition
against misconduct in the bar admission process.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the propriety of denying bar
admission to applicants who refuse to answer questions relevant to
moral character. 52 A particularly striking decision by the Court in
this area is Inre Anastaplo,5 3 in which an applicant was denied admission to the Illinois bar notwithstanding "a mountain of evidence so
favorable to Anastaplo that the word 'overwhelming' seems inadequate to describe it." 54 Anastaplo had refused, on first amendment
grounds, to answer questions concerning membership in the Communist Party or any other organization on the Attorney General's list of
subversive organizations. No evidence suggested that the applicant
advocated violent overthrow of the government or engaged in conduct which could, if proven, lead to denial of his application for admission to the bar. His failure to cooperate fully in the character
investigation5 5 was sufficient to support denial of admission.
lack of candor or lack of rehabilitation. Disclosure with repentance may be seen as tantamount to an admission of guilt.
49 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 44 (1961); see also In re Walker, 112
Ariz. 134, 539 P.2d 891 (1975) (non-disclosure of failure to register for the draft and prior
arrest warrants), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956 (1976); In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771
(1975) (misrepresentation concerning prior arrests and Air Force discharge), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Willis v. North Carolina State Bd. of Law Examiners, 423 U.S. 976 (1975); In re
Capace, 110 R.I. 254, 291 A.2d 632 (1972) (untruthful denial that another person took the
Law School Admission Test for the applicant).
50 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4)-(5), 7I02(A)(I)-(6), 7-106(B) (1982); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3, 3.4(b),

8.4(c),(d) (1983).
51 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101 (B) (1982); see also MODEL
Rule 8.1 (1983).

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

52 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
53 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
54 Id. at 107 (Black, J., dissenting).
55 The applicant was forthright in responding to all questions, including those related to
his political beliefs, except that he refused to answer questions concerning his religious views
and affiliations, whether he was ever a member of the Communist Party, and whether he ever
belonged to any organization on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. The
questions were triggered by Anastaplo's support of the right of revolution against an oppressive government, a right asserted in the Declaration of Independence. This support was ex-
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Anastaplo may be criticized for permitting bar admission authorities to pursue highly intrusive fishing expeditions as part of the
moral character inquiry.5 6 Its greater weakness, however, is that it
denied admission to an applicant on moral character grounds without any evidence of deceit or other wrongdoing. The applicant in
Anastaplo was forthright in refusing to answer questions, his refusal
was narrow and principled, and no evidence was adduced to show
that he concealed damaging facts.
Kon'gsberg v. State Bar of Califoria 7 decided at the same time as
Anastaplo, presents a closer case, since the questions which the applicant in Konigsberg refused to answer were prompted by damaging information provided to the bar admission authorities. A witness in
the applicant's character investigation stated that the applicant had
attended meetings of members of the Communist Party. When questioned about his association with the Communist Party, the applicant refused to answer on first amendment grounds. The Supreme
Court affirmed the California decision denying bar admission. 58 The
political questions posed to the applicant in Konigsbergwere "substantial[ly] relevan[t] to his qualifications" because of the existence of
damaging information. Since there was no such damaging evidence
in Anastaplo, it is questionable whether extended inquiry into the applicant's political beliefs had "substantial relevance to his
qualifications."
Subsequent to Konigsberg and Anastaplo, the Supreme Court has
held that an applicant's views and beliefs are immune from questions
"designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law."'59 Also, an applicant may not be denied admission to the
bar "solely because he is a member of a particular political organizapressed in response to a question on the bar admission application asking the applicant to
identify the principles underlying the United States Constitution.
56 Anastaplo was asked whether he was associated
with scores of organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan, the Silver Shirts (an allegedly Fascist organization), every organization on the so-called Attorney General's
list, the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the Communist Party. At
one point in the proceedings, at least two of the members of the Committee insisted
that he tell the Committee whether he believes in a Supreme Being ...
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 102 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
57 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
58 The Court held that "the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against arbitrary state
action does not forbid a State from denying admission to a bar applicant so long as he refuses
to provide unprivileged answers to questions having a substantial relevance to his qualification." Id. at 44.
59 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971).
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tion or because he holds certain beliefs."' 60 Nor may an applicant be
required "to state whether he has been or is a 'member of any organization which advocates the overthrow of the government of the
United States by force.' "61 Bar admission authorities, however, apparently may ask whether an applicant is or has been a member of
the Communist Party or of any organization which the applicant
knows to advocate the forcible overthrow of the government and
which the applicant spefwialy supports in its illegal goals. The Court
regards these questions as substantially relevant to an applicant's
qualifications.
The result of Koni'sberg is that bar admission may be denied on
moral character grounds solely for refusing to answer questions
which are substantially relevant to the applicant's qualifications.
Critics of the rule present this attack:
The automatic rule means than an applicant, regardless of the
strength of the rest of his record, can be denied simply because he
refuses to answer on principle a question he deems improper. If,
however, we take the conscientious objector stance seriouslyand there is much in American history to suggest that we
should-the rule can only operate to prefer applicants who are
willing to answer over those who on principle are not. But
among those who will answer must be some insensitive to the possible impropriety of the question and many sensitive to it but
persuaded to swallow their indignation in order to be admitted;
whereas on the other side, assuming good faith, we have those
who have this much courage in their convictions. The argument,
therefore, is that the automatic rule is arbitrary in that it prefers
the servile and insensitive to the courageous-and all under
the
62
rubric of a proceeding to determine good moral character.
If the bar admission applicant refuses to cooperate in the character investigation, bar admission authorities have three choices:
they can deny admission, they can admit the applicant on the chance
that he is concealing no significant information, or they can conduct
their own further investigation and rely on its results. In cases involving first amendment rights, the latter course is appealing and
comports with the protections usually afforded admitted lawyers in
63
disciplinary proceedings.
60

Id. at 6 (emphasis added).

61

In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971); see also Law Students Civil Rights Research Coun-

cil, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
62 Kalven & Steffen, The BarAdmission Cases- An Unfinished Debate Between Justice Harlan
andJustice Black, 21 LAW IN TRANSrTON 155, 185-86 (1961).

63

The burden of proving misconduct in attorney discipline proceedings is generally
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Not all applicants who refuse to answer permissible questions
will be denied admission to the bar, even though the Supreme Court
has said that they may be. In rejolles6 4 involved an applicant who
admitted prior membership in the Communist Party but asserted
that he resigned from the party some four years prior to seeking admission to the bar. The bar admission authority asked the applicant
to divulge the names of some of his former colleagues in the Communist Party in order to substantiate his claim that he had resigned.
The applicant attempted to obtain permission from such people to
divulge their names and to arrange for the Board of Bar Examiners
to interview them anonymously. When neither of these efforts to
protect his former colleagues was successful, the applicant refused to
disclose any names. The Oregon court was impressed by the applicant's sincerity and his efforts to comply with the Board's demands.
The court also believed that the further investigation sought by the
Board was unlikely to yield significant results. In light of these considerations and favorable evidence presented by the applicant, the
court determined that the applicant satisfied the good moral character requirement.
When a court is faced with a bar admission case in which an
applicant to the bar has refused to answer questions concerning political beliefs and conduct, the most equitable approach is to make a
balanced assessment, as the court did in jolles. The court should consider the full record, including the likely probative value of the unanswered questions. The Anastaplo approach, under which an applicant
placed on the party seeking to have discipline imposed. See, e.g., In re Marcus, 107 Wis. 2d
560, 576, 320 N.W.2d 806, 815 (1982); see also note 21 supra.
In addition, an attorney may not be disbarred for refusing to answer, on fifth amendment grounds, questions put to him in disciplinary proceedings. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S.
511 (1967). Justice Harlan, in his dissent, noted the logical extension of this rule to bar admission cases:
[The holding of the majority] exposes this Court itself to the possible indignity
that it may one day have to admit to its own bar [a lawyer who asserts his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination] unless it can somehow get at the truth
of suspicions, the investigation of which the applicant has previously succeeded in
blocking. For I can perceive no distinction between "admission" and "disbarment"
in the rationale of what is now held.
Id. at 521 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
If a fifth amendment refusal to answer questions cannot be grounds for disbarment or
denial of admission, should not a good faith refusal on first amendment grounds be treated
similarly, even though courts may not be required to do so?
It should be noted, however, that the scope of the fifth amendment protection in lawyer
discipline cases remains unsettled. For a useful analysis and compilation of cases, see
ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 101: 2401-03 (1984).
64 235 Or. 262, 383 P.2d 388 (1963).
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may be denied admission upon refusal to answer relevant questions
even in the absence of any damaging information, seems more punitive than sensible. TheJolles approach does entail a risk that a truthful, but violent revolutionary with a fairly clean record may refuse to
answer political questions and be admitted to the bar. This possibility, however, is obviously remote and is by far outweighed by the
interest in treating bar admission applicants fairly.
One final case involving an applicant's misconduct in the bar
admission process relating to his political belief and conduct warrants attention. The applicant in Siegel v. Committee ofBar Examiners65
was a radical activist in Berkeley around 1970. During the character
investigation, the California Committe of Bar Examiners reviewed
recordings of three speeches which the applicant had delivered to
Berkeley residents. The committee interpreted these speeches, which
expounded a radical political theory and called for concerted action,
as advocating unlawful violence. The applicant denied that his
speeches carried that meaning or intent. Concluding that the applicant's denials were lies and that he therefore lacked good moral character, the committee recommended against admission. It specifically
stated that it found a lack of good moral character on the basis of the
applicant's lies, not on the basis of his advocacy of unlawful violence. 66

Thus, the determinative issue was what the applicant

claimed he had said, not the freedom to speak the words in the first
place.
In discussing this issue, the Supreme Court of California held:
If a prospective speaker knows that at some time in the future he
may be called upon to interpret his remarks before a body concerned with his admission to professional status, and that such
admission may depend upon his making an assessment of those
remarks which agrees with that made by the official body itself,
he may well feel constrained to confine his public utterances to
statements wholly free of ambiguous and provocative aspects.
The inevitable 6result
would be a dampening of the vigor of spoken expression. 7
The court ordered that the applicant be admitted because it could
not conclude "beyond any reasonable doubt that the applicant's version
[of his original words' meaning] not only [was] objectively false but
[had] been advanced by him with an intent to deceive the
65
66
67

10 Cal. 3d 156, 514 P.2d 967, 110 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1973).
Id. at 165, 514 P.2d at 973-74, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22.
Id. at 175-76, 514 P.2d at 981, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
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Committee. ",68
In the cases in which the applicant's misconduct in the bar admission process involves political belief and conduct, the misconduct
usually is a refusal to answer questions. In non-politics cases, however, the applicant's misconduct usually consists of concealing damaging information or giving misleading or false answers to questions.
This misconduct often concerns prior illegal conduct. 69 It is often
difficult to tell whether those cases in which the applicant was denied
admission are based principally on the applicant's cover-up in the
character investigation or on other forms of misconduct, including
the conduct which was concealed. In virtually all the cases resulting
in denial, misconduct outside of the character investigation would
have justified denial of admission. 70 Thus, it is possible that misconduct in the bar admission process, although often cited as a basis for
denying admission, is largely a make-weight or pretextual rationale.
Reese v. Board of Commissioners,71 a recent Alabama case, is an interesting study in the weight accorded candor in the bar admission
process. In his first year of law school, the applicant in Reese filed an
application for registration as a law student. The application required disclosure of any instances in which the applicant was
charged with violating federal or state law or city ordinances, other
than minor traffic violations. In response to this question, the applicant disclosed convictions for driving while intoxicated or under the
influence of drugs and for disorderly conduct. Subsequently, the Alabama State Bar Committee on Character and Fitness learned that
the applicant failed to disclose thirteen additional brushes with the
law. The undisclosed information included additional convictions
for driving while intoxicated, disorderly conduct, and possession of
an open can of beer in a moving vehicle, as well as arrests not resulting in convictions for possession of marijuana, posession of narcotics,
68 Id. at 178-79, 514 P.2d at 983, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
69 See, e.g., In re Mitan, 75 Ill. 2d 118, 387 N.E.2d 278 (1979) (failure to disclose name
change in an attempt to conceal felony conviction), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 916 (1979); In re
Bowen, 84 Nev. 681, 447 P.2d 658 (1969) (false statements concerning prior arrests and convictions); In re Davis, 38 Ohio St. 2d 273, 313 N.E.2d 363 (1974) (evasive answers respecting
felony conviction).
70 See, e.g., Spears v. State Bar of Cal., 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697 (1930) (failure to disclose
charges filed in other states involving forgery, misappropriation of guardianship funds, and
receiving stolen goods, because charges had been dismissed or conviction reversed on appeal);
In re Ascher, 81 111. 2d 485, 411 N.E.2d 1 (1980) (failure to disclose pending lawsuit charging
applicant with "gross misconduct including fraud and forgery"); In re Moore, 301 N.C. 634,
272 S.E.2d 826 (1981) (failure to disclose assault conviction, although murder conviction was
disclosed).
71 379 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1980).

1984]

BAR ADMISSION

and disturbing the peace. Some of these additional charges were
later disclosed by the applicant in hearings; others were revealed by
outside sources. The applicant was also less than candid in hearings
held to further investigate his character. 72 Moreover, the committee
received two derogatory letters and one derogatory affidavit concerning the applicant's character, although the committee apparently did
not rely on these character assessments in its decision not to certify
the applicant.
The Alabama Supreme Court held that the applicant established his good moral character through several favorable letters of
recommendation from judges and lawyers. The court held that the
record as a whole created no substantial doubt about the applicant's
good moral character, even though the omissions, both in number
and seriousness, suggested an intent to conceal the facts. The court
made no attempt to justify or explain the applicant's lack of candor.
Presumably, because the concealed facts did not themselves justify an
adverse character ruling, neither did the misconduct in the bar admission process. An opposite result might well be reached under
75
Schware,73 Konz'sberg74 and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
These facts present an interesting dilemma. In the context of
bar admission, should a lie about inconsequential matters carry the
same significance as a lie about possibly-dispositive matters? If not,
then dishonesty in the bar admission process is itself inconsequential.
If Reese were an anomaly, the court's magnanimous treatment of
the applicant's misconduct in the bar admission process would not be
especially disturbing. Other decisions, however, reflect the same attitude. In In re Klahr,76 the Supreme Court of Arizona determined,
without any specific explanation, that an applicant was of good
moral character notwithstanding a finding by the Committee on Examinations and Admission that he was "less than truthful" in his
72 At the second hearing before the Committee on Character and Fitness, in response to a
direct question, Reese stated that he had made full disclosure. However, when confronted
with information concerning additional offenses, he admitted them. At the third hearing,
Reese disclosed still other offenses. Id. at 566.
73 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (permits denial of bar admission on moral character grounds if the conduct in question has a rational connection with the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law).
74 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (permits denial of bar admission if
the applicant is not candid in the character investigation).
75 DR 1-101(A) prohibits a lawyer from making false statements in the bar admission
process. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (1983).

76

102 Ariz. 529, 433 P.2d 977 (1967).
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testimony before the committee. 77 In In re Waters,78 the Nevada court
admitted an applicant who, in response to a specific question, did not
disclose his expulsion from a law school for cheating on the Law
School Admission Test. The court concluded that the concealment
of the expulsion was not deliberate.
These cases seem to undervalue the significance of misconduct
in the bar admission process. 79 Bar admission authorities should recognize that the ultimate effect of treating lies about inconsequential
matters as inconsequential is to treat all lies in the bar admission
process as inconsequential. Requiring truthfulness of lawyers should
be more than a rhetorical exercise.
III.

Prior Illegal Conduct

The Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits lawyers from
engaging in illegal conduct in the course of representing clients 8o and
from engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. 81 Because most applicants to the bar have never practiced law, the prohibition against illegal conduct in the course of representing clients
rarely affects moral character determinations in bar admission cases.
Illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, on the other hand, can be,
and frequently is, the basis for denying bar admission. This standard
naturally raises questions about what constitutes "illegal" conduct
and what conduct involves "moral turpitude." The choice of the
word "illegal," rather than "criminal," may be telling. Non-criminal
77 Id. at 530, 433 P.2d at 978.
78 84 Nev. 712, 447 P.2d 661 (1968).
79 The most flagrant undervaluation of dishonesty in the bar admission process may be
contained in State Bar v. Turner, 31 Cal. 2d 842, 192 P.2d 897 (1948), in which the California
court came precariously close to saying that dishonesty in the bar admission process is not an
appropriate basis for denying admission. In the context of a proceeding to revoke an attorney's license based on dishonesty in the bar admission process, the court distinguished two
similar cases in which revocation was not ordered "because in neither of those proceedings
was it shown that the facts concealed would have justified the committee in refusing to recommend admission." Id at 844, 192 P.2d at 897-98.
However, it is wise to remember that at least two factors complicate such decisions.
First, predictions regarding an applicant's future transgressions if admitted to practice are
highly inexact. See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra. Second, notwithstanding serious character-related blemishes on an applicant's record, favorable evidence of good moral character
may outweigh the negative evidence. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232 (1957).
80 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7)-(8) (1982).
81 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(3) (1982); cf. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983) (professional misconduct includes
criminal acts which reflect "adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects").
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activity may be illegal in at least two senses: the conduct may not
have resulted in a criminal conviction, or the conduct may carry only
civil consequences. In bar admission cases, courts have held that acquittal or dismissal of criminal charges does not preclude consideration of the conduct underlying those charges in the character
assessment.8 2 Moreover, applicants with records of shady dealings
have been denied admission even though never charged with a crime
83
nor apparently guilty of any criminal conduct.
Moral turpitude is a virtually useless standard for establishing
lack of moral character. Footnotes to the official American Bar Association version of the Code of Professional Responsibility define
"good moral character" as "qualities of truth, of a high sense of
honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility. '8 4 "Moral turpitude" is defined as "baseness, vileness
or depravity in the duties which one person owes to another or to
society in general." 85 In short, good moral character is goodness and
moral turpitude is badness, neither possessing fixed boundaries.
At common law, attorneys were automatically disbarred upon
conviction of any felony or upon conviction of a misdemeanor involving fraud or dishonesty. 86 In the bar admission process, most
courts now take a more expansive view. These courts will consider
the nature, number of instances, and recency of the illegal conduct,
as well as other evidence tending to show present moral character
87
and evidence of rehabilitation.
The legion of bar admission cases involving the impact of prior
illegal conduct on the good moral character requirement are usefully
82 See note 46 supra.
83 See, e.g., In re Kadans, 93 Nev. 216, 562 P.2d 490 (1977) (denial based on apparent
misrepresentations outside of the character investigation *concerningapplicant's authorship of
books, possession of academic degrees, professional appointments, and nature of a correspondence school operated by applicant), appealdimissed,434 U.S. 805 (1977); In re Alpert, 269 Or.
508, 525 P.2d 1042 (1974) (denial based on applicant's involvement in dubious, though possibly legal, stock transactions); see aso text accompanying notes 125-27 infra.
84 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon I n.14 (1982) (quoting
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
85 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 n.13 (1982) (quoting Committee on Legal Ethics v. Scheer, 149 W. Va. 721, 726-27, 143 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1965)).
86 See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883). At common law, disbarment could also be
based on gross malpractice, dishonesty, or conduct gravely affecting the lawyer's professional
character. Id at 273.
Some jurisdictions continue to maintain an absolutist treatment of lawyers convicted of
felonies who have not received a full pardon for the conviction. See, e.g., In re Florida Bd. of
Examiners, 350 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1977); In re Kastenbaum, 341 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1976); In re
Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 183 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1966).
87 See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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catalogued elsewhere.8s More pertinent to the purpose of this article
is the identification of the relationship between past illegal conduct
and the ethical standards imposed upon lawyers. The Code of Professional Responsibility offers mixed guidance. An ethical consideration states: "Because of his position in society, even minor violations
of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal
profession. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law."'89 This admonition differs substantially from the mandatory precepts of the
disciplinary rules, where the focus is on illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude and illegal conduct in the course of representing a
client. 90

The ethical consideration identifies two concerns which are not
reflected in the disciplinary rules-concerns for the public image of
the profession and for respect for law. Because these concerns are not
reflected in the disciplinary rules, they do not supply a rational connection between past illegal conduct and fitness to practice law. 9 '
Any such rational connection must be grounded in the disciplinary
rules.
The disciplinary rule prohibiting illegal conduct in the course of
representing a client reflects a concern for legitimate limits in furthering a client's interests, 92 while the disciplinary rule prohibiting
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude suggests a concern for morality as distinct from legality. 93 One major difficulty is that the disciplinary rules do not provide a workable standard for identifying
"moral turpitude." The mental state of the actor should generally be
considered relevant: one who engages in unintentional illegal conduct is less morally culpable than one who engages in intentional
88 See Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 192 (1978).
89 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1982); see also id., EC 9-6.
90 See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
91 Courts sometimes discipline lawyers for the sole stated reason that a failure to discipline the lawyer would likely harm the public image of the legal profession. See notes 108-13
infra and accompanying text. To permit a concern for the public image of the profession to
stand as an independent basis for denying bar admission on moral character grounds substantially departs from the requirement that denial be based on conduct rationally connected
with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Adverse public reaction to an applicant's bar admission cannot be tantamount to unfitness to practice law, if unfitness to practice law is to be defined in a principled (i.e. rational) way.
Respect for law also fails to provide a useful standard. It cannot be (and is not) rigorously applied to deny admission to every applicant who ever committed an illegal act. See,
e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). "Minor violations of law" are
treated, ordinarily, as not dispositive of moral character issues.
92 This issue applies almost exclusively to bar admission cases in which the applicant was
previously admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction.
93 In this context, "illegality" constitutes a larger universe than "immorality."
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illegal conduct. Additionally, a person whose illegal act is malum
prohibitum is considered less morally culpable than one whose illegal
act is malum in se, while conduct in violation of civil law is generally
considered less morally repugnant than conduct in violation of criminal law.
Theoretically, these distinctions could be the basis for formulation of an objective rule, such as limiting the scope of "illegal conduct involving moral turpitude" to intentional acts in violation of
criminal laws which prohibit conduct which is malum in se. Hard
and fast rules, however, are inappropriate in this area, particularly
since evidence of rehabilitation plays an important role in good
moral character cases involving past illegal conduct. Certain illegal
conduct such as criminal abuse of the legal process, fraud, and embezzlement, is clearly incompatible with ethical standards imposed
upon lawyers and may therefore justify denial of admission to the
bar.94 Just as clearly, isolated and dated instances of shoplifting, possession of beer as a minor, and intoxication ought not, by themselves,
justify denial of admission. 95 Between these extremes lies an extraordinary diversity of cases which yields little concrete guidance as
to when past illegal conduct will block admission and when proof of
rehabilitation offsets the negative impact of such conduct.
These cases have sometimes resulted in perplexing inconsistencies. For example, the Supreme Court of Maryland recently decided
two cases involving past illegal conduct. In 1981, the court denied
bar admission to an applicant who had been convicted of stealing
sleeping pills and leaving the scene of an accident, notwithstanding a
psychologist's report that the applicant had resolved the problems
leading to his earlier behavior. 96 In 1982, the court ordered that the
convicted driver of a getaway car in a bank robbery who failed to
fully disclose the circumstances of the conviction on his bar application be admitted on evidence of rehabilitation and present good
94 Cf In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1977) (pro hac vice admission denied based
on plea of guilty to two counts of criminal contempt for delaying and giving evasive testimony before a federal grand jury); Lark v. West, 289 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (admission to
the bar denied because of mail fraud conviction), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 865 (1961); People ex
rel Deneen v. Gilmore, 214 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 737 (1905) (disbarment for failure to disclose
embezzlement conviction in another state in application for admission).
95 See, e.g., In re David H., 294 Md. 546, 451 A.2d 657 (1982) (applicant conditionally
admitted despite pleas of nolo contendere to shoplifting charges); In re Schaeffer, 273 Or. 490,
541 P.2d 1400 (1975) (applicant admitted despite conviction for possession of beer as a minor); In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665 (1966) (applicant permitted to take bar
examination, despite denial five years earlier, where only recent offense was for intoxication).
96 In re G.S., 291 Md. 182, 433 A.2d 1159 (1981).
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9 7

moral character.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, recently adopted by
the American Bar Association, abandon the standard of "illegal conduct involving moral turpitude" and prohibit instead any "criminal
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects." 981 This standard is amplified by
the following comment to the Rules:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful
failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction
was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude."
That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning
some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the
practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to
the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics
relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty,
breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of
justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even
ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. 99
Thus, the Model Rules establish a criminal misconduct provision that operates very much like the good moral character requirement for bar admission: the focus is upon fitness to practice law.
The standard permits broad discretion, but requires a rational connection between the criminal act and fitness to practice law before a
lawyer may be disciplined. The effect is to bring the disciplinary
rules for attorneys and the good moral character requirement for bar
applicants into virtual conformity.
Some courts have recognized the logical necessity of treating bar
admission applicants and admitted lawyers alike. The Supreme
Court of California, for example, has held:
In re G.L.S., 292 Md. 378, 439 A.2d 1107 (1982).
In North Carolina, an applicant was denied admission on moral character grounds because of convictions for trespassing, driving while intoxicated, and driving in violation of a
limited driving license. In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1,215 S.E.2d 771 (1975), appealdismissedsubnom.
Willis v. North Carolina State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 423 U.S. 976 (1975). In Alabama, an
applicant established his good moral character notwithstanding two convictions for driving
while intoxicated, three convictions for disorderly conduct, and several additional arrests,
some of which resulted in additional convictions. Reese v. Board of Comm'rs, 279 So. 2d 564
(Ala. 1980).
97

98
99

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Id., Rule 8.4 comment.

Rule 8.4(b) (1983).
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Fundamentally, the question involved in both situations is the
same-is the applicant for admission or the attorney sought to be
disciplined a fit and proper person to be permitted to practice
law, and that usually turns upon whether he has committed or is
likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude.10 0
Other jurisdictions, however, treat admitted lawyers and bar applicants very differently in fitness determinations relating to illegal
conduct. For example, an applicant in Florida was denied bar admission on moral character grounds because he failed to file income
tax returns, 10 1 even though Florida lawyers recently subject to discipline actions for failing to file income tax returns had not been disbarred, but had merely been reprimanded. 10 2 The Florida court
justified the different standards for admission and disbarment on the
theory that denial of admission is less severe than disbarment since
0 3
an applicant denied admission may reapply after two years.'
This justification is suspect. A court which imposes a public reprimand as the sole sanction for an admitted lawyer who has engaged
in illegal conduct has obviously not determined that the lawyer is
unfit to practice law. If the failure to file an income tax return does
not establish unfitness for an admitted lawyer, how can the same act
establish unfitness for a bar applicant?
Even if admitted lawyers and bar admission applicants are
treated alike, difficult questions remain. Determining what illegal
conduct is rationally connected with fitness to practice law can be
perplexing. Standards for establishing rehabilitation are also elusive,
in part because the most convincing evidence of rehabilitation is
often the simple passage of time without transgressions.
The treatment of lawyers who have failed to file income tax returns illustrates the difficulty of assessing the rational connection between specific illegal acts performed in a lawyer's non-professional
life and the lawyer's fitness to practice law. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that the wilful failure to file income tax re100 Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 453,421 P.2d 76, 81,55 Cal.
Rptr. 228, 233 (1966); see also In re H.H.S., 373 So. 2d 890, 893 (Fla. 1979) (Adkins, J.,
dissenting).
101 In re H.H.S., 373 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1979).
102 See Florida Bar v. Turner, 344 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1977) (public reprimand); Florida Bar
v. Soloman, 338 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1976) (six-month suspension where failure to file income tax
return was coupled with other instances of misconduct); In re Schonfeld, 336 So. 2d 77 (Fla.
1976) (public reprimand); Florida Bar v. Silver, 313 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1975) (public reprimand); In re Snyder, 313 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1975) (public reprimand).
103 In re H.H.S., 373 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 1979).
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turns is rationally connected to fitness to practice law,10 4 but offers no
rationale for that conclusion. Many lawyer discipline cases involving
the failure to file income tax returns are reported,1 0 5 with results
ranging from findings of no cognizable misconduct 10 6 to long-term
suspensions.107 Those courts favoring serious discipline are concerned primarily with preserving public confidence in the legal profession, 108 while those courts opposing discipline believe that serious
discipline is warranted only where the lawyer is likely to breach his
professional duties to clients or tribunals.109
Courts and bar admission authorities must decide how broadly
the net should be cast to protect the public. If the goal is to rout out
all lawyers who might cause members of the public to distrust the
legal profession generally, the net must be cast very broadly. If, on
the other hand, the courts are seeking only to protect the public from
lawyers who would victimize them or victimize the legal process itself, the net does not need to be cast as broadly. A choice between
these alternative goals is essential if the meaning of "fitness to practice law" is to be clear. Otherwise, the goal of consistent and rational
decision-making about unprofessional misconduct will remain
elusive. 110

IV.

Financial Malfeasance

A disciplinary rule of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer may not "[e]ngage in any. . . conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.""' Under this catch104 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) comment (1983).
105 See Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 476 (1975); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 512 (1975).
106 See, e.g., In re Anonymous No. 1, 45 A.D.2d 88, 357 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1973).
2d 223, 265 N.E.2d 101 (1970) (five year suspension for failing
107 See In re Lambert, 47 Ill.
to file returns for 17 years).
108 See, e.g., In re O'Hallaren, 64 Ill. 2d 426, 434, 356 N.E.2d 520, 523-24 (1976) ("An
attorney's failure to file returns and his subsequent conviction of that offense diminish public
confidence in the legal profession and tend to bring it into disrepute."); see also note 91 supra.
109 See, e.g., In re Gillis, 402 Mich. 286, 293, 262 N.W.2d 646, 649 (1978) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) ("The rules should. . . provide that only misconduct in the course of professional
activities or conduct outside of professional activities indicating that a lawyer can no longer
be trusted to represent clients or appear in court warrants discipline."); see note 94 supra.
110 If the broader standard-harm to the public image of the legal profession-is adopted,
consistent and rational decision-making about unprofessional misconduct may remain an impossible goal. Such factors as media coverage and speculations as to public opinion clearly
affect the projected harm to the profession's image that a given instance of misconduct is
likely to cause. These factors are unprincipled and do not lead to consistent and rational
decision-making.
111 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A) (6) (1982). But see note
14 supra.
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all rule and Schware, an applicant whose conduct, even if wholly legal, has a rational connection with unfitness to practice law could be
denied admission. Applicants have been denied admission to the bar
on moral character grounds because of financial malfeasance, even
though no illegal conduct was involved. The most striking examples
are a recent group of cases in which applicants avoided student loan
12
obligations through bankruptcy proceedings.
Student loans are a peculiar species of debt, especially in the
context of bankruptcy proceedings. Students, unlike most borrowers,
generally have no tangible assets to pledge as security for the fulfillment of their student loan obligations. In congressional debate on
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Congressman Erlenborn of Illinois
stated:
The student. .. , not having assets to pledge, is pledging his
future earning power. Having pledged that future earning
power, if, shortly after graduation and before having an opportudischarge that
nity to get assets to repay the debt, he seeks to
obligation, I say that is tantamount to fraud." 3
Although some courts may share these sentiments, the supremacy clause of the Constitution restricts their ability to determine
that a bar admission applicant lacks good moral character based on
his legal invocation of bankruptcy proceedings to discharge student
loan obligations. Under the supremacy clause, state laws may not
frustrate the full effectiveness of federal laws.' 4 A primary purpose
of federal bankruptcy law is "to give debtors a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort.""15 Denying bar admission because an applicant legally avoided student loan obligations frustrates
the full effectiveness of federal bankruptcy law and the cleansing wa6
ters which it provides."*
1
7
In Inre Gahan, 1 the Minnesota Supreme Court denied bar admission to an applicant who discharged $14,000 in federally-guaranteed student loan obligations through bankruptcy proceedings, while
affirming all other dischargeable debts.' 18 The court concluded that
112 Zn re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978); In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979); In
re Taylor, 293 Or. 285, 647 P.2d 462 (1982).
113 124 CONG. RFC. 1793 (1978).
114 See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971).
115 Id at 648.
116 See general'y Special Project, Admission to the Bar: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 655, 696-710 (1981).
117 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979).
118 At the time that Gahan invoked the federal Bankruptcy Act, it permitted the full
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the applicant was financially able to meet his student loan obligations at all relevant times. In denying admission, the court held:
A flagrant disregard of this repayment responsibility by the loan
recipient indicates to us a lack of moral commitment to the rights
of other students and particularly to the rights of creditors. Such
flagrant financial irresponsibility reflects adversely on an applicant's ability to manage financial matters and reflects adversely
on his commitment to the rights of others, thereby reflecting adversely on his fitness for the practice of law. It is appropriate to
prevent problems from such irresponsibility by denying admission, rather than seek
to remedy the problem after it occurs and
9
victimizes a client."
The rational connection between the applicant's bankruptcy
and his fitness to practice law is hazy at best. 120 The federal policy,
now altered, which allowed students to fully discharge their student
loans like any other debt l2 might well be criticized; abuses were substantial, as the facts in Gahan illustrate. Nevertheless, the legal pursuit of federal rights, even if improvidently granted, does not portend
the victimization of clients. The links which the court found between
the applicant's discharge of his student loans and unfitness to practice law-inability to manage financial matters and lack of commitment to the rights of others-are rather weak. Respecting the ability
to manage financial matters, the facts in Gahan suggest that this may
have been a particular strength of the applicant. He maximized the
value of his exempt assets in contemplation of bankruptcy and took
full advantage of the cleansing waters that federal bankruptcy law
provides. In doing so, he was careful to preserve his creditworthiness
by affirming all debts other than student loans. Nothing in the applicant's bankruptcy suggested any legally-cognizable fraud, deceit, or
moral turpitude.

122

The court held that the applicant's discharge of his student
loans in bankruptcy adversely affected the rights of creditors and
other students. Bankruptcy law, however, places a clear limit on
creditors' rights by establishing a set of debtors' rights. The applicant's bankruptcy infringed upon no creditors' rights; it was merely
discharge of student loans like any other debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1976), amended by 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. 11 1978).
119 Id. at 831.
120 It is possible that the Gahan court was voicing its dissent to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, now altered, which permitted the full discharge of student loans like any other
debt.
121 See note 118 supra.
122 279 N.W.2d at 828.
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an exercise of the applicant's rights as a debtor.1 23 Under federal law
at the time, the discharge of student loan obligations in bankruptcy
was simply one vehicle through which Congress implemented its belief that sound public policy favored the discharge of debts in bankruptcy; Congress viewed the debtor's right to a fresh start as more
compelling than the creditor's right to repayment. The applicant in
Gahan did no more than effectively secure his legal rights against
creditors.
The applicant's bankruptcy affected the rights of other students
in only the most amorphous sense. If permitting the discharge of
student loans through bankruptcy was an uriwise policy, it was for
Congress to change the policy; the applicant was under no obligation
to refrain from exercising a right created by federal law. Allowing a
business expense deduction for the "three-martini lunch" may be an
unwise federal policy; yet, few would conclude that lawyers who deduct such expenses, thereby endangering the continued availability
of more legitimate deductions for business lunches and also increasing the tax burden on others, are therefore unfit to practice law.
Bar admission authorities and courts ought not to label applicants as lacking good moral character and therefore refuse them the
opportunity to engage in a profession for which they are otherwise
qualified on the basis of their assertion of clearly-recognized legal
rights. This is especially true where, as in Gahan, it is difficult to see
what forms of unethical conduct the applicant would engage in if
admitted to the bar.
Financial malfeasance unrelated to student loan obligations has
proven an impediment to bar admission in a few additional cases;
however, most such cases involve conduct which appears to be illegal.' 24 One exception is In re Alpert,125 in which an applicant was
denied admission because of his involvement in "dubious," although
apparently legal, stock transactions while in law school. The applicant had purchased stocks on credit, expecting to pay for the stocks
out of interim increases in their value. The stocks decreased in value
after the applicant's purchase and before the deadline for payment,
123 Moreover, a lack of commitment to the rights of creditors is arguably unrelated to
victimizing clients, since an attorney's relationship to his client is of a fiduciary nature,
whereas a debtor's relationship to his creditor is not.
124 See, e.g., In re Appell, 116 N.H. 400, 359 A.2d 634 (1976) (violation of various statutes
and regulations in operation of construction business); In re Cheek, 246 Or. 433, 425 P.2d 763
(1967) (signing employer's name on checks without authority to do so; issuing personal checks
without sufficient funds).
125 269 Or. 508, 525 P.2d 1042 (1974).
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with the majority of the losses falling on the seller. The Oregon court
denied the applicant admission to the bar, despite a favorable recommendation from the trial committee of the Board of Bar Examiners.
The court held that the legality of the transactions was "beside the
point"1 26 and that "doubts of consequence" about an applicant's
moral character were to be construed against the applicant and in
127
favor of the public's protection.
In other words, the applicant in Alpert was denied admission because of "doubts" created by financially disasterous, but apparently
legal, stock transactions. It seems likely that, if the applicant's stock
transactions had yielded a profit instead of a loss, the court would
not have denied admission. The court expressed concern that the
applicant was willing to take financial chances, knowing that he
would be unable to make up the losses in the event that the enterprise failed. The court failed to consider that such risks are common
to many business ventures-so common that investors usually consider them carefully before making any financial commitment.
A court which determines that legal conduct in financial affairs
has a rational connection with fitness for law practice is making a
business judgment with respect to that financial conduct. Such a
court is, in effect, substituting its own business judgment for that of
the applicant and his investors and labeling it "moral" judgment.
Courts and bar admission authorities alike ought to be extremely
wary of denying admission on this basis, and in no event should invocation of a clear, federally-provided right trigger denial of admission
to the bar.
V.

Mental or Emotional Instability

The most nebulous basis for denying admission on moral character grounds is that the applicant's personality is unfit for the practice of law due to mental or emotional instability.1 28 While no
126 Id.at 514, 525 P.2d at 1045.
127 Id. at 518, 525 P.2d at 1046.
128 Surprisingly few moral character cases involve actual mental illness. Perhaps some
cases in which the court focused on illegal conduct involve applicants suffering from mental
illness where the illegal conduct is symptomatic of the illness, although in no case has the
court identified this relationship. A number of illegal conduct cases involve alcohol or drug
abuse. See In re A.T., 286 Md. 507, 408 A.2d 1023 (1979) (drug addiction); In re Gimbel, 271
Or. 671, 533 P.2d 810 (1975) (alcoholism); In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665 (1966)
(alcoholism).
Although it bears little on contemporary bar admission issues, it is interesting to note the
primordial impediment to bar admission relating to unfitness of an applicant's personality.
At common law, women were ineligible for admission to the bar. See In re Bradwell, 55 Ill.
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disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility directly
address the problem of mental or emotional instability, an ethical
consideration does:
An applicant for admission to the bar or a lawyer may be unqualified, temporarily of permanently, for other than moral and
educational reasons, such as mental or emotional instability.
Lawyers should be diligent in taking steps to see that during a
period of disqualification such person is not
29 granted a license or,
if licensed, is not permitted to practice.
Reported bar admission decisions in this area generally involve persons who exhibit abnormal behavior, whether or not victims of
mental illness. The form of abnormal behavior which appears to
give bar admission authorities the greatest pause is a combative personality, often coupled with a tendency to make enemies (or perceive
others as enemies) and to hurl invectives at those real or perceived
enemies.
The applicant in In re Latimert30 filed a "scurrilous" petition with
the Illinois Supreme Court attacking members of the Committee on
Character and Fitness, circulated pamphlets disparaging members of
that committee and members of the Illinois court, and submitted an
affidavit accusing character witnesses before the committee of being
Communists. The court held that these tactics in the character investigation process for bar admission thwarted, and demonstrated
contempt for, the orderly administration of the investigation and re535, 538-40 (1869), afdsubnomn. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). The rationale for this exclusion was expressed in an 1875 Wisconsin decision:
The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and nurture
of the children of our race and for the custody of the homes of the world and their
maintenance in love and honor. And all life-long callings of women, inconsistent
with these radical and sacred duties of their sex, as is the profession of the law, are
departures from the order of nature; and when voluntary, treason against it ...
The peculiar qualities of womanhood, its gentle graces, its quick sensibility, its
tender susceptibility, its purity, its delicacy, its emotional impulses, its subordination
of hard reason to sympathetic feeling, are surely not qualifications for forensic strife.
Nature has tempered woman as little for the juridical conflicts of the court room, as
for the physical conflicts of the battle field. Womanhood is moulded for gentler and
better things.
In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245, 20 A.R. 42, 46-47 (1875). In this instance, the lawyer's occupation, rather than the bar applicant, was found wanting of "good moral character." The
profession of law "has essentially and habitually to do with all that is selfish and malicious,
knavish and criminal, coarse and brutal, repulsive and obscene, in human life." Id.at 245, 20
A.R. at 47. Following the enactment in 1878 of a legislative provision expressly prohibiting
denial of bar admission in Wisconsin based on sex, Ms. Goodell was admitted to practice. In
re Goodell, 48 Wis. 693, 81 N.W. 551 (1879).
129 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-6 (1982).
130 11111. 2d 327, 143 N.E.2d 20 (1957), appealdimissedand cert. denied, 355 U.S. 82 (1957).
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flected negatively on the applicant's moral fitness for law practice.
For these and other reasons, the applicant was denied admission.
In re Feingod 13 1 concerned an applicant whose prior history allegedly indicated "a propensity to engage in unwarranted character
assassination." 1 32 In unrelated events, the applicant had: been indicted (but not tried) for criminal libel; struck opposing counsel during an administrative hearing; by his own admission, called the
Attorney General "every name in the book"; 133 and made a derogatory remark in the presence of others to a judge before whom he had
a case. The moral character issue concerning this applicant was not
resolved due to procedural infirmities; however, the court indicated
that "[t]urbulent, intemporate or irresponsible behavior is a proper
34
basis for denial of admission to the bar."'
In In re Martbn-Trigona,135 the court denied admission to an applicant with a "propensity to unreasonably react against anyone whom
he believes opposes him."' 36 The applicant had accused a judge who
ruled against him of a "pathological antipathy" against him which
rendered the judge "temporarily mentally insane. 1' 37 In addition,
the applicant had referred to an attorney who served a notice of forfeiture upon him and who suffered from a mild case of cerebral palsy
as a "palsied lunatic" and described him as "shaking and tottering
and drooling like an idiot .

.

. a physically and mentally sick

man."' 138

In denying admission, the court determined that the applicant lacked "the qualities of responsibility, candor, fairness, self-restraint, objectivity and respect for the judicial system which are
1 39
necessary adjuncts to the orderly administration of justice."
Latimer, Feingold,and Martin-Tngonashare a central element: the
bar admission applicant became malicious in response to legal setbacks. Ethical considerations encourage lawyers to be "temperate
and dignified"' 140 and disciplinary rules prohibit a lawyer from taking action "merely to harass or maliciously injure another."' 4' Thus,
131 296 A.2d 492 (Me. 1972).
132 Id. at 498.
133 Id. at 499.
134 Id. at 500.
135 55 Ill. 2d 301, 302 N.E.2d 68 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
136 Id. at 308, 302 N.E.2d at 72.
137 Id
138 Id. at 310, 302 N.E.2d at 73.
139 Id. at 312, 302 N.E.2d at 74.
140 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1982).
141 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1983); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 comment (1983).

1984]

BAR ADMISSION

the applicants' misconduct in Latimer, Feingold, and kfartin-Trigona
may be rationally connected to fitness to practice law, as defined by
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Other bar admission cases suggest that such malicious conduct
may indicate a lack of good moral character even if it arises apart
from proceedings before a court or tribunal. For example, the applicant in In re Ronwin'42 appeared "mentally unable to reasonably deal
with the type of social interaction involved in dealing with clients,
other members of the Bar and the public."' 143 Expert testimony indicated that the applicant had a" 'paranoid personality' which is characterized by hypersensitivity, rigidity, unwarranted suspicion,
excessive self-importance and a tendency to blame others and ascribe
evil motives to them."' 1 The applicant had made critical comments
and strong charges against administrators and faculty members at
the law school which he attended and threatened physical violence
toward others when he became angered during discussions of academic matters. The court determined that the applicant was unfit
for law practice because he would probably "bring and prosecute
groundless claims and subject clients, parties, the Court and adversary counsel to groundless charges of misconduct and
45
impropriety."1
Psychiatric or psychological evaluations play a role in some of
46
the cases involving an applicant's mental or emotional instability,'
while others use no expert guidance in evaluating the applicant's fitness for practice. 47 The area is a particularly sensitive one, especially since not all forms and degrees of emotional instability are
rationally connected with fitness or capacity for law practice. Certainly, bar admission authorities should deny admission to applicants
whose mental or emotional instability render them unfit for the practice of law. The Supreme Court of Vermont recognized the difficulty
142 113 Ariz. 357, 555 P.2d 315 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Ronwin v. Special Comm. on
Examinations and Admissions, 430 U.S. 907 (1977).
143 Id. at 359, 555 P.2d at 317.
144 Id
145 Id. at 358, 555 P.2d at 316. The applicant in Ronwin subsequently brought suit
against the Arizona State Bar and members of Arizona's Committee on Examinations and
Admissions for antitrust violations in the grading of the Arizona bar examination. The
United States Supreme Court held that the action of the Committee was an action of the
Arizona Supreme Court, and thus the Committee's conduct came within the state action
exemption from the antitrust laws. Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
146 See, e.g., In re Ronwin, 113 Ariz. 357, 555 P.2d 315 (1976); In re Martin-Trigona, 55 Ill.
2d 301, 302 N.E.2d 68 (1973); In re Schaengold, 83 Nev. 65, 422 P.2d 686 (1967).
147 See, e.g., In re Latimer, 11111. 2d 327, 143 N.E.2d 20, appeal dimissedand cert. denied, 355
U.S. 82 (1957).
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of such cases in In re Monaghan,148 in which it permitted an application for bar admission from a reformed alcoholic whose admission
had been denied five years earlier:
The power of the court to reject the application on the
grounds of moral delinquency is one of great delicacy, and should
be exercised with extreme caution, and with a scrupulous regard
for the character and rights of the applicant.149
These decisions are made more delicate by the imprecision of
standards by which mental or emotional stability is measured. Bar
admission authorities may feel more comfortable in assessing moral
character by focusing on the symptoms of mental or emotional insta1 50
bility rather than on the degree of instability itself.
Conclusion
Virtually everyone would agree that some applicants ought to
be denied admission to the bar for reasons unrelated to their technical legal skills. To use an extreme case, nearly all would agree that a
lawyer who was disbarred yesterday for a recent theft of clients'
funds should not be admitted today to practice law in a neighboring
jurisdiction. The requirement of "good moral character" is the rule
upon which the denial would be based.
Given the desirability of such a requirement, the problem is to
devise a rule which recognizes the fine line between applicants whose
past conduct portends future misconduct as a lawyer and those who
have erred in the past but deserve the opportunity to practice law
because their error was unrelated to the requirements of law practice
or because their error is not symptomatic of their present character
and behavior. The line which has been drawn-the requirement
that applicants prove their good moral character to be admitted to
the bar-is, standing alone, extremely imprecise. It "is easily
adapted to fit personal views and predilections [and] can be a dan148 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665 (1966).
149 Id. at 64, 222 A.2d at 674.
150 For a very useful analysis of the good moral character requirement as it relates to
mental and emotional stability, especially given the state of medical knowledge in the area of
mental health, see Place & Bloom, Mental Fitness Requirementsfor the Practiceof Law, 23 BuFFALO L. REV. 579 (1974). See also Kaslow, Moral, Emotional and Physical Aitnessfor the Bar:
Pondering (seeming) Imponderables, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1982, at 38.
For a recent decision expressly holding that mental and emotional fitness is required for
admission to practice law, see Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Applicant, 443 So. 2d 72 (Fla.
1983). The Florida court also held that the burden of demonstrating this fitness is on the
applicant and that bar admission authorities may inquire about an applicant's mental and
emotional fitness without violating the applicant's privacy and due process rights. Id.
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gerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the
15
right to practice law." '
These dangers are lessened somewhat by requiring that a bar
applicant's past misconduct may block admission only if it is a rationally connected to his fitness to practice law. 152 But the necessity
of interpreting "fitness to practice law" may revive all of the dangers
of a bare "good moral character" standard unless fitness to practice is
tied to the standards imposed upon persons who actually practice
law. These standards are embodied in the rules which form the basis
for disciplining lawyers, usually some variant of the disciplinary rules
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This article has examined some of the usual patterns of conduct
resulting in moral character questions. Some of this conduct is closely
related to disciplinary rules imposed upon lawyers while some bears
little relation to those rules. Fairness to bar applicants and a uniform
concern for the protection of the public dictate the need for a closer
alignment of the fitness assessments made of bar applicants through
the good moral character requirement and fitness assessments of admitted lawyers through disciplinary proceedings. While perfect consistency in these assessments may not be attainable, it is certainly a
worthy goal, especially when the stakes are the protection of the public from unethical lawyers, access to the privileges and powers which
only lawyers enjoy, and the composition of the legal profession in the
decades to come.

151
152

Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957).
See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).

